NC

To negate[[1]](#footnote-1) means “**to deny the** existence or **truth of**,” so first presume neg because negating requires no positive justification and second any argument that proves the resolution false is sufficient to negate. The res is a comparison of two goals acted upon by developing countries, of whether environmental protection should be given greater priority as an aim over resource extraction. Nebel[[2]](#footnote-2)

. The reason is that **what has to do the prioritizing** in order **to be topical is the agent.** Your advocacy must be that the agentprioritize EP over RE, whatever that means. In this case, that agent is ‘developing countries.**Just because an agent implements some policy** or set of policies **that prioritize[s] EP over RE does not mean** that **the agent itself prioritizes EP over RE**. This may seem like a picky distinction, but consider some examples. **Suppose I chose to spend time with my friends** tonight, **rather than work on a paper**. This choice might prioritize friendship over work. But **this** choice **does not make it the case that Iprioritize friendship over work**. **I might** actually be the kind of person who **prioritize**s **work over friendship, so that I** almost **always choose to write a paper** when I could instead hang out with friends, **but this night** is the rare opportunity when **I hang out with my friends**. So, just because some choice or action prioritizes one thing over another does not entail that the agent prioritizes one thing over another. If we assume that an advocacy is topical only if it makes it the case that the agent does what the resolution says it ought to do, then this means that **implementing a particular policy that prioritizes EP over RE is not enough to be topical**. (That is, absent evidence about this policy having the effect of changing developing countries’ priorities as a whole. But then this advocacy might only be effects-topical.)

In order for environmental protection to be prioritized, it must be possible for developing countries to know whether their actions are in accord with or in violation of the goal of protecting the environment.

1. We must be able to explain the unity of action. Laurence[[3]](#footnote-3) :

Expanding on an example from Anscombe we may consider a case where a man is making tea.12 Let us suppose he (i) fills up the kettle, (ii) turns on the stove, (iii) puts the water on to boil, (iv) places a tea bag in each of several cups, (v) waits for the kettle to whistle, and then (vi) pours the boiling water into each cup. All along as he does first one thing and then another the man is making tea: there is some one thing he is doing throughout: when he is finished doing them all he will have made tea. So here we have several actions the performance of which adds up to the performance of a single action. And, furthermore, they all are done with the intention of making tea. So here, also, we have several actions that “share” an intention. But what is involved in this?Let us consider it from the perspective of the explanation of action. The sort of explanation we are interested in here is the one investigated by Anscombe in which an explanation cites the agent’s reasons for acting. The question “Why?”, heard in the right way, is a request for such an explanation. If we ask our man why he is filling the kettle he might say he is heating some water. And when we query this in turn, he might say that it’s because he’s making tea. Here we see a nested set of explanatory relations. For example, (i) and (ii) are explained with reference to (iii), and (iii) as well as each of the other items on the list— including (i) and (ii)—can be explained by adverting to the fact that the man is making tea: the reason the man is doing all those things is that he is making tea. The several actions thus share an explanatory unity: they are all to be explained as phases or elements of tea-making.13 We could gesture at the same explanatory point by saying that it is no accident that the man is filling the kettle—he is filling the kettle precisely because he’s heating water. And it is no accident that he’s heating water—he is doing that precisely because he is making tea. Unlike a random collocation of actions, perhaps culled haphazard from a list of actions performed by an agent on one particular day, these actions are not arbitrarily related, but rather are fit together in a unified explanatory series as elements of the action they serve.

The unity of an action can be explained by its principle only when we can derive each phase of the action as being a means to the end given by the principle. Then, each phase of the action will be unified because the agent knows that the means are together sufficient to bring about the end given by the principle. This means that we can only explain an action’s unity if it is possible for an agent to know that the means she takes in her action are sufficient to achieve the principle guiding the action.

2. Morality is action guiding, so it must be governed by principles that enable agents to make a determinate choice between courses of action. So, we can only prioritize a principle that provides a reason for agents to do one thing rather than another. A principle that failed to meet this requirement would be equally consistent and inconsistent with every action, and so would not guide a choice between courses of action. A principle can only play this role if it is possible for agents to know whether their actions are in accord with or in violation of that principle. Absent this, a principle would be equally as consistent and inconsistent with every action, and so would not guide a choice between courses of action. Even if morality need not guide action in general, it must serve that role in context of the actor. If we only cared about principles abstracted from whether those principles guide action, there would be no reason to deliberate about policies at all. The resolution indicates governments don’t construct new principles, but to act as the institutional mechanism by which we enforce our principles.

3. The condition of identifying your action as your own is to identify what you are doing as in line with the principle of choice on which you act. However, that is only possible if it is possible for you to know that what you are doing is in accordance with the principle as opposed to the principle. Korsgaard[[4]](#footnote-4):

The first step is this: To conceive yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle which favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A. In this kind of case, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. You regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some [a] third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self- conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.

4. For a rational principle to be a principle at all, it must be justified by reason. A rational principle is statement from which certain actions are excluded. (For example, if I say it is going to rain today, it necessarily follows from that principle that the ground will be wet and that principle excludes the possibility of the ground being dry). Thus principles are only coherent insofar as the agent who acts upon the principle can know whether they are consistent with or in violation of the principle, because otherwise the agent couldn’t determine which actions are excluded or necessarily follow from the principle. Moreover, a principle can only be identified as unique if the agent sees the set of actions that are excluded or follow from the principle as distinct from a set of actions excluded or entailed by another principle. If both set were the same, then the principles would be the same. To identify the principle as having any content at all is to see what follows from it or is excluded by it.

**Thus, the sufficient negative burden is to show the affirmative’s advocacy is an impossible principle of action.**

I contend environmental protection violates the conditions of actors knowing whether their actions are in accord with or in violation of that principle.

1. No change in the environment is better or worse for the environment, because improvement is contingent on the perspective of the agent within the environment. Objective goods for the environment don’t exist because the good influences different organisms- for example, arsenic is poisonous to humans but beneficial for fish. The only way to make a judgment of whether a change is protective or damaging is if the object has an internal purpose. For example, cutting of a dog’s leg is bad for the animal because a dog has a purpose to flourish. Consistency with that purpose determines use or misuses, but the environment lacks exactly that purpose.

2. Actions taken to protect the environment are in service of an infinite end. Resource extraction is finite, which makes it impossible that extracting resources now will undermine future access, because the question whether the agent extracts resources is a question of carrying out an action here and now. To protect the environment is to commit oneself to caring about the environment for undefined period of time- there is no logical cutoff point. Agents can act upon the principle of resource extraction and know their actions are consistent with said principle because they are not rationall required to care about extracting in the future.

1NR Best Justification O/V

(Short)

Framework debate is about which theory is better justified, not absolutely true. I need not deductively prove my ethical theory but merely show it’s better justified than any alternative. Framework arguments link back to different metastandards, so credence in one metastandard should be indication a higher link is false if it’s one. This means defense on frameworks can’t trigger skepticism or presumption, because that only shows my framework isn’t 100% correct and debaters have to weigh between meta standards and links to the meta standards.

(Long)

My burden is to prove the converse of the res is better justified than its affirmation. Prefer a best justification paradigm where the resolution is affirmed if its better justified than its negation:

A) Truth testing grants the negative an infinite variety of skeptical objections such as skepticism or prestandard arguments which explodes negative ground while holding the aff to perfection. For best justification a dropped pre-standards argument merely provides some evidence that a belief in the resolution is unjustified; the strength of that evidence depends on the strength of the argument. Ground is key to fairness because equal access to offense determines access to the ballot.

B) Comparative worlds harms philosophical literature and education by embedding a desirability evaluation of states of affairs that excludes deontology because it tests whether an action is consistent with maxims. Phil lit is key to education because it fosters critical thinking about normative questions.

Framework debate is about which theory is better justified, not absolutely true. I need not deductively prove my ethical theory but merely show it’s better justified than any alternative. This means defense on frameworks can’t trigger skepticism or presumption, because that only shows my framework isn’t 100% correct.

2NR Turn O/V

The NC is a NIB, two warrants:

1. the framework is a side constraint on action, so showing a principle meets the constraint does not imply it ought be prioritized, only that neither should be prioritized in which case the resolution is textually false so negate

2. Resource extraction is governed by a finite principle- it just is by definition a fixed process of removing substances from the earth with no higher aim. Err meg- the text of the burden structure details what the aff must do, so I reserved the right to clarify.

1NR Aims/Implementation

[Action theory dictates this / action theory comes first args? Or are you saving them for the 2N … Also, we should discuss how this works under implementation or “evaluative ought” views — imp: imp sees the rez as a question of whether it is good to implement the principle, but the NC arguments operate at the level of the implementability of the principle, that is the action theory stuff; eval ought: NC says cant prioritize a princip (saying it is evaluatively better) if can’t act from it bc cant say its better if incoherent to act from it]

2NR A2 NIBS Bad

1. I meet- the NC is necessary and sufficient for both debaters…

2. CX Checks solves- it’s not insufficient but if it was then I would’ve just granted her artificial sufficiency. The NC comes first, so all the turns on the aff are irrelevant because the NC functions on a higher layer, so she can just kick her AC and spend 4 minutes on defense. Solves reciprocity because the round is now 1-1, and solves clash because all clash now is focused on the NC contention.

3. Err Neg on the violation debate, two warrants:

A. Real world- In the real world, you’re innocent until proven guilty. She is initiating offensive theory, so she has a proactive burden to prove I violate her interpretation. If you are at all unsure, default negative and evaluate substance.

B. Proportionality- there is minimally a risk I meet her interpretation and I have mitigated the abuse, so punishing me with a loss or kicking the NC for me is grossly proportional because it’s the ultimate punishment. No 2NR RVI solves abuse since we can just go back to substance, this round doesn’t have to get decided on theory

4. No new 2AR responses or explanation- if her argument wasn’t on your flow in the 1AR don’t vote on it

A. Skews my time and strategy-force me to preempt argument that she won’t go for and shift away from relevant issues

B. lack of a 3NR means I have no ability to respond

Lastly, reject the argument…

Alternate Framework

Unity of Action

First, actions are expressions of an agent’s reasoning from their end to the means, which unifies their action into a cohesive movement as opposed to fragmented steps. Rodl[[5]](#footnote-5)

We can give a more specific description of the consciousness of temporal unity that constitutes that unity: it is an act of reasoning. For example, she who is crossing the street because she is getting bread reasons in this way: wanting to get bread, she thinks the fact that the bakery is across the street is a reason to cross the street. She reasons from her end (getting bread) to the means (crossing the street). The unity of the movement represented in “She is doing A” is constituted by reasoning of this form: she is doing A by holding together in one consciousness her idea of doing A and her idea of doing B, being conscious of her nexus.

Rodl indicates the act of voting is the product of the agent’s internal reasoning, not an external force that compels him to vote.

Constitutivism

Second, only a constitutivist account of moral motivation provides agents with non-optional reasons for acting. Katsafanas[[6]](#footnote-6)

Enter a third theory, which attempts to do just that: constitutivism. According to constitutivism, there is an element of truth in both the internalist and the externalist positions. For the constitutivist agrees with the internalist that the truth of a normative claim depends on the agent’s aims, in the sense that the [an] agent must possess a certain aim in order for the normative claim to be true. But the constitutivist [constitutivism] traces the authority of norms to an aim that has a special status, an aim that is constitutive of being an agent. This constitutive aim is not optional; if you lack the aim, you are not an agent at all. So the constitutivist agrees with the internalist that practical reasons derive from the agent’s aims; but the constitutivist holds that the relevant aim is one that is intrinsic to being an agent. Accordingly, the constitutivist gets the conclusion that the externalist wanted: there are non-optional reasons for acting. Put differently, there are reasons for action that arise merely from the fact that one is an agent.

Framework Weighing

Unity of Action

General

1. Probability- Action must be an instance of the agent’s self-determination and reasoning, or else our common act descriptions would be incoherent. The idea of “giving up,” “succeeding” or “being interrupted” in action only makes sense if we take action to be unified, as otherwise they would merely mark a distinction between two discrete actions rather than a break in the steps of one action.
2. Controls the internal link to the aff standard- Only the agent’s reasoning from the end to the means unifies their action, otherwise his framework would collapse since action would be a meaningless collocation of infinitely small steps. Morality at the highest level is a guide to action, so my framework is the only way to solve for his.
3. Scope- Ethical theories grounded on factors contingent to agents being rational willers, like our desires or states of affairs, fail to generate binding principles because said theories rest on principles that can change or that agents could rationally judge as incorrect. Only principles that are derived from the rational will are necessary, and thus binding on agents in general- also another warrant for probability.

A2 Personhood/Identity/Metaphysics

A. I control uniqueness- the decision making process implies that desires are mediated external principle – you can choose among them. This doesn’t require some deep view of personhood. Korsgaard

The second element of this pragmatic unity is the unity implicit in the standpoint from which you deliberate and choose. It may be that what actually happens when you make a choice is that the strongest of your conflicting desires wins. But that is not the way you think of it when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which one to act on. The idea that you choose among your conflicting desires, rather than just waiting to see which one wins, suggests that you have reasons for or against acting on them. And it is these reasons, rather than the desires themselves. which are expressive of your will, The strength of a desire may be counted by you as a reason for acting on it but this is different from its simply winning. This means that there is some principle or way of choosing that you regard as expressive of yourself and that provides reasons that regulate your choices among your desires. To identify with such a principle or way of choosing is to be “a law to yourself,’ and to be unified as such This does not require that your agency be located in a separately existing entity or involve a deep meta-physical fact. Instead, it is a practical necessity imposed upon you by the nature of the deliberative standpoint

Therefore, a stable practical identity is not a prerequisite

B. Hijacks his links- Even if our identity could be fragmented, that would only reduce to desires if you already thought that desires and wants are at the core of a moral theory. However reasons are at the core of a moral theory since the structure of a reason is always the same even if our identity shifts; an abstract theory like deontology wouldn’t take the individual perspective into account since it dictates general principles that are not contingent on personal identity so only my framework can solve for his account of personhood.

A2 Actor Specificity

A. Strength of Link- Democracies as collective agents act through reasoning of individual agents. Laurence[[7]](#footnote-7)

It is enough that the same order displayed in collective action explanation can also be represented as a set of rational transitions justifying the actions undertaken by members of a group in light of a shared objective. In this way, whether or not there is strictly speaking a unitary knowing subject of the whole action, we can still see the actions in question as recommended by reasoning. This reasoning will not, of course, occur through the exercise of a separate practical reason possessed by the group, but rather through the reasoning of the individual members as the execute their shared objective. We might sum this up by saying that just as a collective agent can only act through the actions of its individual members, it can only know through their knowing, and reason through their reasoning.

Even if actor specificity outweighs my metastandards in a vacuum, strength of link determines size of impact. I link to actor specificity and have mitigation on his link, but he has no link to unity of action so my framework combines the best of both.

B. Motivational- agents wouldn’t act in accordance with a moral theory if its justifications appeal to something external to themselves, since saying the state must use this moral theory simply begs the question- it allows them to question why. Practical reasoning however is internal to all agents, represented in self evident actions.

M=Action Guiding

General

A. coopts his internal links- we both agree that morality should guide action, or else he wouldn’t have read a normative framework. I derive the requirement of a principle from the nature of morality itself, instead of a framework link chain so I coopt the shared assumption.

B. probability- the requirement is much more likely correct since I only need to win one link from morality being action guiding to the NC thesis, whereas he needs to win multiple links- each defensive argument on his link chain lowers the external probability of the entire theory being correct

Actor Specificity Comparison

My links to actor specificity are so much better than his:

A. his arguments start from contractual agreements between people that then derive a framework for the developing country, but my arguments reverse the process- my burden follows form the very nature of state action being an institutional mechanism

B. even if he is right, the NC is still a side constraint that functions on a higher level. The state has to know whether its actions are in accordance with a publically justifiable principle, or else it would fail as a state.

Constitutivism

General

A. Reversibility- an agent cannot fail to adhere to their constitutive aim without loosing their agency, since to be an agent is just to see yourself as the cause of your own actions. Thus inconsistency with constitutivism forecloses the possibility of being an agent.

B. Inescapable—two warrants. Ferrero[[8]](#footnote-8)

3.1 The initial appeal of the shmagency objection rests on the impression that there is a close analogy between agency and ordinary enterprises. If one can stand outside of chess and question whether there is any reason to play this game, why couldnʼt one stand outside of agency and wonder whether there is any reason to play the agency game? The problem with this suggestion is that the analogy does not hold. Agency is a very special enterprise. Agency is distinctively ʻinescapable.ʼ This is what sets agency apart from all other enterprises and explains why constitutivism is focused on it rather than on any other enterprise. 3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ʻradical re-evaluationʼ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.133.3 The second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agencyʼs closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency.14Agency is not necessarily self-reflective but all instances of reflective assessment, including those directed at agency itself, fall under its jurisdiction; they are conducted in deference to the constitutive standards of agency. This kind of closure is unique to agency. What is at work in reflection is the distinctive operation of intentional agency in its discursive mode. What is at work is not simply the subjectʼs capacity to shape her conduct in response to reasons for action but also her capacity both to ask for these reasons and to give them. Hence, agencyʼs closure under reflective rational assessment is closure under agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15 3.4 To sum up, agency is special because of two distinctive features. First, agency is not the only game in town, but it is the biggest possible one. In addition to instances of bare intentional agency, any engagement in an ordinary enterprise is ipso facto an engagement in the enterprise of agency. Second, agency is closed under rational reflection. It is closed under the self- directed application of its distinctive discursive operation, the asking for and the giving of reasons for action. The combination of these features is what makes agency inescapable. This is the kind of nonoptionality that supports the viability of constitutivism.

Four impacts here

1. I control the link to instantiation of his framework- to merely reflect about his standard is an act of agency

2. Probability- what distinguishes humans from animals is that humans actions are instances of intentional agency, not merely the product of impulses or desires. We know that humans are distinct from animals, so that requires a different constitutive aim

3. Solves back schmagency and skepticism- you can escape the game of chess but you’re still an agent- to reflect and question your agency is an act of agency

4. Motivation- constituvism provides non optional reasons for acting, so it ensures a motivational force internal to the concept of being an agent

A2 Communal Discourse/Aggregation

This also preempts aggregations frameworks that claim every agent has a differing perspective and values. Reject frameworks that aggregate individual views via polls or emotive response because the idea of the individual view as the most basic unit of collective reasoning is flawed – Laurence indicates that the intentions of individual agents are synthesized into a collective action, involved in the adoption of the perspective of a shared consciousness.

FW Frontlines

A2 Korsgaard= Aiming At Action

1. You don’t know what it means to act consistently with it or not- my claim is that it doesn’t make sense we aspire to what we’re doing because to think that you have to think what I’m doing is inline with it- if anything you do is equally consistent then you couldn’t think you’re aspiring to the principle

2. Korsgaard says view action as yours because you know what your doing is justified the principle, that’s what it means for the reason to be internal to the action- steps explained as justified by the principle. Without that the aspiration for the principle can only take the form of psychological causation and that doesn’t meet the constraint

A2 “Principle isn’t possible=>Presumption/Ignore NC/Res is indeterminate)

1.This argument conflates the incoherence of a principle with the incoherence of the criminal justice system prioritizing it. My argument in the contention is that the criminal justice system cannot take truth seeking as a coherent principle, but it doesn’t deny the CJS can prioritize it- it would just be an idiotic priority. Any agent can take themselves to operation under a principle that is incoherent, because it might be the case that they are doing something unjustifiable but doing it unknowingly. This means I’m not denying an assumption of the resolution by saying truth seeking as a goal is incoherent, because the resolution assumes only that truth seeking can be prioritized or given precedence.

2. Presumption is offense for me- the definition of to negate indicates the aff must prove the resolution decisively true, because any argument that denies the resolution’s truth is a reason to negate. If the resolution is nonsensical or indeterminate, then it can’t be true, so negate.

Rhonheimer=>Util

If Rhonheimer is correct and we care about state of affairs, that implies util: Collective action results in tradeoffs and conflicts that only rule consequentialism can resolve. Woller[[9]](#footnote-9) ’97 Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such [but] justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty [is] to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, [Also,] a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse.

1. "negate." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010. Merriam-Webster Online. 18 August 2010. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [Jake Nebel](http://victorybriefs.com/?author=502ae281e4b0f52d614f0682), “[Topicality, Implementation, and What We Ought to Prioritize](http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2014/1/topicality-implementation-and-what-we-ought-to-prioritize)”. Vicotry Briefs Daily, January 29th, 2014. <http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2014/1/topicality-implementation-and-what-we-ought-to-prioritize>. RP 1/30/14 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ben Laurence, “An Anscombean Approach to Collective Action”. University of Chicago, pp.8-10. RP 9/8/13 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, “SELF-CONSTITUTION IN THE ETHICS OF PLATO AND KANT”. [The Journal of Ethics](http://link.springer.com/journal/10892) 1999, Volume 3, [Issue 1](http://link.springer.com/journal/10892/3/1/page/1), pp 1-29. Specifically, “VII. GOOD ACTION AND THE UNITY OF THE KANTIAN WILL”. Professor of Philosphy, Harvard University. RP 7/21/13 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Sebastian Roedl. Prof. Of Philosophy, University of Leipzig. “Two Forms of Practical Knowledge and Their Unity” in Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Katsafanas, Paul. “Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzchean Version of Constitutivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. Boston University: 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ben Laurence. Prof. Of Philosophy, University of Chicago. “An Anscombean Approach to Collective Action” in Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 293-294. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Luca Ferrero, “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency”. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV, Jan 12, 2009.(https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/ferrero/www/pubs/ferrero-constitutivism.pdf) Professor of Philosophy, University of Wesconsin at Milwaukee. RP 7/21/13 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Gary Woller [BYU Prof., “An Overview by Gary Woller”, A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics, June 1997, pg. 10] [↑](#footnote-ref-9)